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CONSUMER INJURY IN ANTITRUST
LITIGATION:
NECESSARY, BUT BY WHAT STANDARD?
WILLIAM H. ROONEYt
INTRODUCTION
Since the early days of the rule of reason under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, the effect of the challenged conduct on
competition has been central to whether the conduct is lawful.'
The Clayton Act also makes the actual or likely competitive
effect of the arrangement in question directly relevant to the
lawfulness of that arrangement under that statute.2 In addition,
the Supreme Court-under section 2 of the Sherman Act-has
clarified that competitive effect is relevant to the lawfulness of
conduct challenged as either attempted or actual
monopolization. 3
Aside from cases governed by the per se rule of illegality or
the quick-look doctrine, proving that the conduct in question has
or would cause an "anticompetitive" effect has thus been an
t Partner, Willkie Farr & Gallagher. I gratefully acknowledges the useful and
extensive assistance of Laila Abou-Rabme and Julie 0. Veit, also of Willkie Farr &
Gallagher, in the preparation of this Article. The Article was written in connection
with a conference entitled "Consumer Injury in Antitrust Litigation: Necessary or
Not?" The conference was held on November 30, 2000 and sponsored by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Northeast Regional Office of the
Federal Trade Commission, the New York State Bar Association, and the American
Corporate Counsel Association.
1 See State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
2 See e.g., United States v. Rockford Mer'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1281 (7th Cir.
1990) (acknowledging the similarity in judging the lawfulness of conduct under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts).
3 See United States v. Du Pont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956) ("Our cases
determine that a party has monopoly power if it has.., a power of controlling prices
or unreasonably restricting competition.") (internal quotation and citation omitted);
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 457 (1993) ("In order to
determine whether there is a dangerous probability of monopolization, courts have
found it necessary to consider the relevant market and the defendant's ability to
lessen or destroy competition in that market.").
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element of most substantive antitrust claims separate and apart
from the "antitrust injury" standing requirements that have
been developed since Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc.4 As courts have increasingly looked to economics to "inform
the antitrust laws," the metes and bounds of a legally cognizable
"anticompetitive" effect have been more clearly defined. The
driving concept, though not always stated, seems to have been
allocative efficiency: whether the challenged conduct distorts the
allocation of economic resources in the production of goods and
services that consumers value most.5
Preserving allocative efficiency fits easily within the
traditional antitrust framework. Relevant consumer preferences
are reflected in market definition,6 allocation is reflected in the
current and potential supply of the relevant product or service,
and distorted allocation is reflected in a reduction in the
output-and a corresponding increase in the price-of the
products or services comprising the relevant market.7 Output, of
course, is multi-dimensional and is understood broadly. It
includes the quantity of the product or service as well as its
quality, which in turn includes functionality, branding, features,
and innovation.
Competitive effect is assessed in light of the impact of the
practice on the allocation of resources. From the perspective of
allocative efficiency, an anticompetitive effect occurs when the
challenged conduct restricts output in a properly defined
relevant market, in a material amount, for a material duration.
A procompetitive effect occurs when the practice in question
expands output in the relevant market in a material amount for
a material duration. A competitively neutral act has no material
effect on the relevant output.
Reducing output typically causes, and is most obviously
4 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
5 See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995).
6 See L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 425 (11th
Cir. 1984); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
7 See, e.g., Stephen Ross, Did the Canadian Parliament Really Permit Mergers
That Exploit Canadian Consumers So The World Can be More Efficient?, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 641, 644 n.14 (1997) (explaining "deadweight loss" as the harm
caused to the economy "when consumers because of higher prices choose an
alternate and less appropriate substitute product for the use they have in mind").
-This inefficient substitution is seen as a misallocation of resources; it is seen as a
loss to society as a whole." Id.
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reflected in, an increase in price-a harm that is acutely felt by
consumers. 8 Some courts have accordingly identified the
objective of the antitrust laws as protecting consumers
("consumer welfare"), not competitors. Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. described the Sherman Act as a
"consumer welfare prescription."9  Hence, the moniker
"consumer injury" has developed as a shorthand means of
describing the anticompetitive effect required for a successful
antitrust claim.
Although the debate over consumer injury in antitrust
litigation is intense, much of the above is not widely disputed.
As discussed in Part I below, courts and the enforcement
agencies generally agree that antitrust analysis (other than that
governed by the per se rule and the quick-look doctrine) turns on
the competitive effect of the practice in question and that such
an effect involves more than harm to a single rival.10 They also
agree that an anticompetitive effect relates to the actual or
anticipated impact of the challenged conduct on output and price
in a relevant market-or in shorthand, on consumers."- Can we
imagine a press release by an enforcement agency that claims its
enforcement of the antitrust laws, instead of vindicating
consumer interests, has protected competitors, dispersed
political or economic power, advanced populism, or eliminated
corporate corruption?
The consensus ends there, however, as coiurts assess
competitive effects very differently. Although most seem to
agree that proof of consumer injury is necessary in antitrust
litigation, many disagree over the standard for proving that
injury. The crucial debate is what evidence is sufficient to
support a finding that, more likely than not, the challenged
conduct was (under section 4 of the Clayton Act) or would likely
be (under section 16 of the Clayton Act) the proximate cause of a
material reduction in output and increase in price in a properly
defined relevant market for a material period of time. A
resolution of that debate has not yet emerged. The differences
are reflected both in the evidence from which courts are willing
8 See Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1434 n.4.
9 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
10 See, e.g., Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433.
11 See Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp.., 258 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001);
Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Med. Prods. Inc., 976 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1992).
2001]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to infer consumer injury and in the scope of the relevant output
as to which competitive effects are measured. Part II addresses
two of the issues on which courts vary in assessing competitive
effect, and discusses cases illustrating those differences.
The first issue poses the question of what inferences can be
drawn from an injury to rivals that results either from output-
expanding conduct or output-restricting conduct on the part of
the defendant(s). Some courts find injury to rivals to be
probative of consumer injury on the ground that numerous
competitors generate the very rivalry that ultimately benefits
consumers. 12 Other courts find injury to rivals to be probative of
consumer benefit as that injury typically results from intense
competition, which in turn usually expands output and lowers
prices. Courts also differ in the inferences they draw from harm
to rivals regarding claimed limitations on consumer choice and
the relevance of those claims to aggregate consumer welfare.
The second issue addresses the scope of the "marketwide"
impact that must be shown for a finding of consumer injury. On
one hand, marketwide impact could be assessed in terms of the
output only of the relevant product and its next-best substitutes,
as is sometimes suggested by both enforcement agencies and
courts in cases where products are differentiated by branding,
price, or features but similar in functionality.13 On the other
hand, marketwide impact, even where the products are
reasonably differentiated, could include the output of the
relevant product and other products which, based on their
objective characteristics and physical availability, would be
functionally interchangeable with the relevant product in the
event its output was restricted or its price increased. We discuss
the issue in connection with retail format (superstores compared
to mass merchandisers and "anchor" hospitals versus
"community" hospitals), a broad price/quality continuum (price
and functionality of various writing instruments), and
geographic consumption patterns (patient and managed care
consumption alternatives).
12 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000)
(explaining that Microsoft's actions injured rivals that form a part of the computer
industry's competitive process, which the court apparently presumed, generally
stimulated innovation and benefited consumers), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 253
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
13 See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (D.D.C. 1997).
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I. THE ANTITRUST OBJECTIVE
Courts and enforcement agencies agree that the Sherman
Act addresses only competitive injuries that have a market
dimension beyond harm to a single competitor.
The Supreme Court has, on a number of occasions over the
last few decades, confirmed that the remedial scope of the
antitrust laws is limited to competitive injuries. In Gordon v.
New York Stock Exchange'14 for example, the Supreme Court
found the respective scope of the antitrust laws and the
securities laws to differ significantly and potentially to conflict:
"[The] sole aim of antitrust legislation is to protect competition,
whereas the SEC must consider, in addition, the economic health
of the investors, the exchanges, and the securities industry."15 In
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,16 the Court
clarified that political corruption, though otherwise unlawful,
lies outside the scope of the Sherman Act: "Congress has passed
other laws aimed at combating corruption in state and local
governments. 'Insofar as [the Sherman Act] sets up a code of
ethics at all, it is a code that condemns trade restraints, not
political activity.' "17
In NYNTEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,18 the Court rejected as
cognizable under the Sherman Act, claims that the defendant
attempted to defraud customers by "hoodwinking regulators":
"[O]ther laws, for example, 'unfair competition' laws, business
tort laws, or regulatory laws, provide remedies for various
'competitive practices thought to be offensive to proper standards
of business morality.'" 19 The Court has consistently defined the
objective of antitrust analysis as limited solely to the competitive
impact of the conduct in question: "[Tihe purpose of [antitrust]
analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance
of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring
competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the
members of an industry."20
14 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
15 Id. at 689.
16 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
17 Id. at 378-79 (quoting E. R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 140 (1961)).
18 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
19 Id. at 137 (citation omitted).
20 National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
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The Court has been equally clear that competitive
significance is not to be judged solely with reference to the
impact of the challenged conduct on a single competitor. Even in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 21 viewed by some as initiating
restrictive antitrust jurisprudence, the Court emphasized that
the antitrust laws protect "competition, not competitors. 22 That
the Court was charting the standard for applying the incipiency
provision of section 7 of the Clayton Act makes the statement all
the more noteworthy. The Court has had many occasions since
Brown Shoe. to transform that proposition into an antitrust
mantra, emphasizing the public or market-related dimension of
the competitive injury requirement on many occasions.
In the section 1 context, the Court in California Dental Ass'n
v. FTC,23 recently identified the ultimate issue under the
competitive effect element of a rule of reason case as the impact
of the challenged conduct on the "total delivery" of the relevant
product or service in the relevant market:
[Tihe relevant output for antitrust purposes here is presumably
not information or advertising, but dental services themselves.
The question is not whether the universe of possible
advertisements has been limited (as assuredly it has), but
whether the limitation on advertisements obviously tends to
limit the total delivery of dental services.
The Court has made the same point in the context of section
2 of the Sherman Act, where the rule of reason is replaced with a
framework that focuses on the acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly power through exclusionary conduct. In Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,24 the Court confirmed that, in a claim
of attempted monopolization, the plaintiff must demonstrate not
only that the defendant had engaged in exclusionary, unfair, or
predatory conduct, but also that the defendant had a dangerous
probability of monopolizing the relevant market:
The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses
from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from
the failure of the market. The law directs itself not against
conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against
conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. It
21 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
22 Id. at 320.
2 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
24 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (9th Cir. 1993).
[Vol.75:561
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does so not out of solicitude for private concerns but out of
concern for the public interest.
25
In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,26 the Court addressed primary-line price discrimination
under the Robinson-Patman Act and discussed, by direct
analogy, predatory conduct under section 2 of the Sherman Act.2 7
The Court required that a plaintiff demonstrate a likelihood that
the defendant would recoup through supracompetitive prices its
investment in the predatory scheme. 28 Without recoupment, the
Court noted, "predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices
in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced ....
[iU]nsuccessful predation is in general a boon to consumers."29
Emphatically affirming the Brown Shoe statement that the
antitrust laws protect competition not competitors, the Brooke
Group Court stated that "[elven an act of pure malice by one
business competitor against another does not, without more,
state a claim under the federal antitrust laws; those laws do not
create a federal law of unfair competition or 'purport to afford
remedies for all torts committed by or against persons engaged
in interstate commerce.' "30
The circuits have followed the Supreme Court's lead with
considerable clarity. The Second Circuit, for example, requires
that a plaintiff prove that the challenged conduct had (or
threatens) an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in
the relevant market.3 1 The Seventh Circuit has held that a
plaintiff, to establish competitive injury, must prove not an
injury to a rival, but rather the "ability [of the defendant] to
control output and prices, an ability that depends largely on the
25 Id. at 458; see also Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) ("The Sherman Act is a law in the public, not private, interest. And even
if the district court's view of Intel as a monopolist were accepted,... to constitute a
violation [of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,] the monopolist's activities must tend to
cause harm to competition; unrelated harm to an individual competitor or consumer
is not sufficient.") (citation and internal quotations omitted).
26 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
7 See id- at 221.
28 See id. at 224.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 225 (quoting Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 826 (1945)).
31 See, eg., Capital Imaging Assocs., v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d
537, 547 (2d Cir. 1993) (denying plaintiffs antitrust claim because it failed to show
that "defendants' activities have had any adverse impact on price, quality, or output
of medical services offered to consumers in the relevant market").
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ability of other firms to increase their own output in response to
a contraction by the defendants."32 The Ninth Circuit requires
that the challenged conduct 'harm 0 both allocative efficiency
and raiseU the prices of goods above competitive levels or
diminish[U their quality."33 The District of Columbia Circuit
evaluates a "firm's ability to restrict output and hence to harm
consumers" when deciding whether an act violates the antitrust
laws.34
The enforcement agencies also seem to acknowledge that an
anticompetitive effect consists of a marketwide decrease in
output and increase in price. The Horizontal Merger
Guidelines,35 for example, contemplate the initial definition of a
relevant market, consider a variety of supply responses, and
ultimately assess the impact of the proposed transaction on
prices and output in the relevant market.36 The Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors37 describe the
rule of reason as focusing on the state of competition
(presumably within a properly defined relevant market) with, as
compared to without, the relevant agreement among
competitors.38 The guidelines identify the "central question" as
"whether the relevant agreement likely harms competition by
increasing the ability or incentive profitably to raise price above
or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below what
32 Ball Memq Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th
Cir. 1986). "[I]njuries to rivals are byproducts of vigorous competition, and the
antitrust laws are not balm for rivals' wounds. The antitrust laws are for the benefit
of competition, not competitors." Id. at 1338.
33 Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
W. Wholesale Supply, Inc. v. Holladay, [2002-1 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 73,578 (9th Cir. 2001).
34 Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 219 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); see also FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053-55 (8th
Cir. 1999) (deciding whether conduct is anticompetitive by evaluating the
consumers' alternatives on a marketwide basis); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc.,
36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994) ("To be judged anticompetitive, the [conduct] must
actually or potentially harm consumers. That concept cannot be overemphasized
and is especially essential when a successful competitor alleges antitrust injury at
the hands of a rival.") (citation omitted).
35 U.S. DEPt OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIzONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997).
36 See id.
37 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
38 Id. § 1.2.
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likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement. 39
Courts and the enforcement agencies thus appear to agree
that consumer injury-an actual or threatened marketwide,
material, and sustained reduction in output (quantity or quality)
and corresponding increase in price-is a necessary element in
antitrust litigation not involving the per se rule of illegality or
the quick-look doctrine. As we shall see below, however, courts
differ significantly on the standard by which they assess whether
a consumer injury has or will occur.
II. CONSUMER INJURY: BY WHAT STANDARD?
Courts use different standards to determine whether the
requisite consumer injury has been proven.
In California Dental, the Court stated that except where "an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets,"40  the
competitive effects issue poses a factual and perhaps largely
empirical question the answer to which cannot be based on
either theory or presumption alone:
[Tihe absence of any empirical evidence on [competitive effects]
indicates that the question was not answered, merely avoided
by implicit burden shiftg.... The point is that before a
theoretical claim of anticompetitive effects can justify shifting
to a defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of
procompetitive effects, as quick-look analysis in effect requires,
there must be some indication that the court making the
decision has properly identified the theoretical basis for the
anticompetitive effects and considered whether the effects
actually are anticompetitive. Where, as here, the
circumstances of the restriction are somewhat complex,
assumption alone will not do.41
The Court, however, offered no prescription for assessing
competitive effect and indeed noted the flexibility of the inquiry,
suggesting that it be "meet for the case, looking to the
circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint."42 Lower courts
are thus left to develop a consistent framework for evaluating
39 Id.
40 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
41 Id. at 775 n.12 (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 781.
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the competitive effect, and hence the lawfulness, of conduct
challenged under the antitrust laws.
That framework has not yet emerged. Courts accord
different significance to similar categories of evidence and
seemingly use different standards to assess marketwide
impact.4 3 Determining the significance of harm to rivals and the
scope of relevant output provides two examples of issues on
which courts have reached inconsistent conclusions on consumer
injury.
A. Harm to Rivals: Indicative of Consumer Injury or Benefit?
One of the great debates of current antitrust jurisprudence
addresses what inferences, if any, can be drawn from harm to
competitors. As discussed below, some argue that harm to
rivals-at least without a "legitimate" business reason-implies
that the defendant engaged in "exclusionary" conduct, injures
the "competitive process," impairs consumer choice, and provides
an adequate basis for inferring consumer injury. After all,
competitors are the prime ingredient of competition, and
harming competitors necessarily, at least to a certain extent,
harms competition.
Others argue that conduct can be characterized as
"exclusionary" only if it restricts, and not expands, total output;
that bankruptcies are common in highly competitive markets;
that the blood of a competitor generally implies a benefit for
consumers; and that courts should be particularly skeptical of
any antitrust claim predicated upon a rival's wounds. Needless
to say, the courts have reached no consensus on those issues.
We discuss below differences among courts in their
willingness to find an antitrust violation based upon harm to
rivals that (1) resulted from output-expanding conduct; (2)
resulted from output-restricting conduct; and (3) limited
"consumer choice."
B. Output-Expanding Conduct
Harm to rivals through output-expanding conduct usually
arises in cases of alleged predation. The expansion of output is
43 Compare Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & WiUiamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 224-25 (1993) (requiring recoupment evidence in order to find a violation), with
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding a violation
in the absence of recoupment evidence).
[Vol.75:561
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generally implemented through lower prices, greater
advertising, improved quality, or broader distribution. The
conduct is often challenged under section 2 of the Sherman Act,
as the alleged predator increases its share of the averred
market-or maintains its monopoly position-at the expense of
the harmed rival.
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,"4 the Second
Circuit identified Aluminum Company of America's (ALCOA)
aggressive expansion of output as a willful scheme to exclude
rivals and an unlawful means of maintaining its monopoly
position:
The only question is whether it falls within the exception
established in favor of those who do not seek, but cannot avoid,
the control of a market. It seems to us that that question
scarcely survives its statement. It was not inevitable that
[ALCOA] should always anticipate increases in the demand for
ingot and be prepared to supply them. Nothing compelled
[ALCOA] to keep doubling and redoubling its capacity before
others entered the field. It insists that it never excluded
competitors; but we can think of no more effective exclusion
than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it
opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity already
geared into a great organization, having the advantage of
experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel. 45
The court made no finding that ALCOA's "doubling and
redoubling capacity" had, or would, raise the price of ingot to
consumers. The focus was on ALCOA's maintaining its large
share and the harmful effect on rivals. Given ALCOA's success
and its rivals' failure, liability followed.
Judge Jackson in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,46 like
Judge Hand in Aluminum Co. of America, focused on the
exclusionary effect of the defendant's aggressive-though
seemingly output-expanding-conduct. Indeed, portions of the
district court's opinion were predicated on the output-expanding
characteristic of Microsoft Corporation's ("Iicrosoft") conduct
and the injurious impact it had on middleware threats to
Microsoft's operating system:
4 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
45 Id. at 431.
46 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, 253
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
20011
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Microsoft paid vast sums of money, and renounced many
millions more in lost revenue every year, in order to induce
firms to take actions that would help enhance Internet
Explorer's share of browser usage at Navigator's expense ....
Microsoft has no intention of ever charging for licenses to use or
distribute its browser. Moreover, neither the desire to bolster
demand for Windows nor the prospect of ancillary revenues
from Internet Explorer can explain the lengths to which
Microsoft has gone. In fact, Microsoft has expended wealth and
foresworn opportunities to realize more in a manner and to an
extent that can only represent a rational investment if its
purpose was to perpetuate the applications barrier to entry.
Because Microsoft's business practices "would not be considered
profit maximizing except for the expectation that.., the entry
of potential rivals" into the market for Intel-compatible PC
operating systems will be "blocked or delayed," Microsoft's
campaign must be termed predatory. Since the Court has
already found that Microsoft possesses monopoly power, the
predatory nature of the firm's conduct compels the Court to
hold Microsoft liable under § 2 of the Sherman Act.47
The district court acknowledged that, at least in some
respects, Microsoft's payment of vast sums of money and its
renouncement of many millions more to expand the output of
Internet Explorer redounded to the benefit of consumers.4 8 The
district court made findings that indicated that browser output
during the period of alleged predation increased fourfold from
around fifteen million browsers to over sixty million browsers.
Microsoft's output increased by a factor of about ten and
Netscape's output more than doubled.49 The price of browsers
dropped during the same period to effectively zero.
Microsoft also appears to have expanded output in terms of
the quality of the package of the operating system and browser
software that it offered (putting aside the question of whether
that package constituted one product or two). For most
computer users, receiving Windows with Internet Explorer
presumably was preferable to Windows without Internet
Explorer at the same price. Indeed, to perpetuate the
"applications barrier to entry," Microsoft necessarily had to
increase during the period in question both the quantity and
47 Id. at 44 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
48 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 110-11 (D.D.C. 1999).
49 See id. at 297, 302, 326.
[Vol.75:561
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quality of its browser output as well as that of its operating
system/browser package. Given that Windows was compatible
with Netscape's Navigator, Microsoft would not likely have
taken substantial browser usage share from Netscape if
Microsoft had distributed a materially inferior Internet Explorer.
Although the court found that consumers would be harmed
through diminished innovation, Microsoft's threatening and
harming rivals, and the inconvenience and burden to some of
receiving an unwanted browser,50 the court made no explicit
finding of "recoupment" by Microsoft. That is, the court did not
find that Microsoft would raise the price of either browsers or
operating systems or even that the then-current price of the
Windows operating system was at the monopoly level.51 Nor did
the court find that Microsoft had sold the operating
system/browser package at a level below cost or that, as a result
of Microsoft's actual pricing or other competitive strategies,
Microsoft would raise or return the price of its operating systems
or browser to the monopoly levels.
The court found the conduct anticompetitive because it was
done at Netscape's expense and with the objective of preserving
Microsoft's alleged monopoly position in operating systems. 52 As
such, the court focused on the impact of Microsoft's conduct on
rivals and Microsoft's own market position but not specifically on
the impact on marketwide output. The district court's analytical
framework resembled generally the Second Circuit's
condemnation of ALCOA's "doubling and redoubling" its capacity
to thwart its rivals, to anticipate its customers' every need, and
preserve its monopoly position.53
Brooke Group on the other hand, required explicit
recoupment in the context of pricing predation under the
Robinson-Patman Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act, noting
that, without recoupment, predation is "a boon to customers"
though harmful to competitors.54 Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co.,55 following Brooke Group, described more fully the
need for recoupment in an output-expanding predatory scheme,
60 See id. at 326-31.
51 See id at 54.
52 See id. at 326-31
53 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,431 (2d Cir. 1945).
M 509 U.S. 209, 224-25 (1993).
55 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).
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and identified recoupment as the source of the consumer injury
necessary for liability in antitrust litigation:
Predatory pricing occurs in two stages. In the first stage, or
"price war" period, the defendant sets prices below its marginal
cost hoping to eliminate rivals and increase its share of the
market. During this phase, the predator, and any rival
compelled to challenge the predatory price, will suffer losses.
Though rivals may suffer financial losses or be eliminated as a
result of the below-cost pricing, injury to rivals at this stage of
the predatory scheme is of no concern to the antitrust laws.
Only by adopting a long-run strategy is a predator able to injure
consumer welfare. A long-run strategy requires the predator to
drive rivals from the market, or discipline them sufficiently so
that they do not act as competitors normally should. If the
predator reaches this long-run goal, it enters the second stage,
the "recoupment" period. It then can collect the fruits of the
predatory scheme by charging supracompetitive prices-prices
above competitive levels.56
To prove consumer injury, the Rebel Oil Court required either
direct evidence of restricted output and supracompetitive prices
or circumstantial evidence of market power and significant
barriers to entry and mobility.57
Where rivals are harmed through output-expanding conduct
by a large market share holder, courts differ in the extent to
which they require proof that the conduct will result in a
subsequent restriction of some dimension of output (quantity,
quality) or increase in price that affirmatively offsets the benefit
to customers from the output expansion. Some courts, such as
Aluminum Co. of America, and perhaps the district court in
Microsoft, seem willing to presume that harm to rivals and the
maintenance of a monopoly position, even through largely
output-expanding conduct, will necessarily harm consumers by
depriving them of the benefits that flow from rivalry among
numerous competitors. Other courts, such as Brooke Group and
Rebel Oil are unwilling to indulge in that presumption and do
not condemn output-expanding conduct unless the plaintiff
demonstrates that consumers will be injured through a
subsequent, though foreseeable and offsetting, reduction in
output and increase in price.
56 Id. at 1433-34 (citations omitted and emphasis added).




Harm to rivals that results from output-restricting conduct
often is challenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act, as it
frequently involves an agreement among two or more actors that
reduces or eliminates output to the harmed rival by the parties
to the agreement. 58 Although the forms of output-restricting
arrangements can vary widely, addressed here are only two
forms to illustrate the differing willingness of courts to infer
consumer injury from competitor harm.
In SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc.,59 Sears, Roebuck and
Company ("Sears"), owner of Discover Card, sued Visa U.S.A.
Incorporated ("Visa") for refusing to admit Sears as a Visa
member in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.60 Sears
argued that its marketing of the "Prime Option" card only as a
Discover Card would not meet the objectives of Sears' "branding
strategy," and that consumers would be harmed by being denied
the opportunity to select a "Prime Option" Visa card among their
possible choices in the general charge card market.61 The Tenth
Circuit began its assessment of Sears' claim by identifying
consumer welfare as the interest to be protected under the
antitrust laws: "To be judged anticompetitive, the agreement
must actually or potentially harm consumers. That concept
cannot be overemphasized and is especially essential when a
successful competitor alleges antitrust injury at the hands of a
rival."62 The Tenth Circuit next noted that consumer welfare
must be assessed on a marketwide basis and that market power
by the parties to the agreement was required for the
agreement to alter the competitive structure of the relevant
market:
Broadly, market power is the ability to raise price by restricting
58 Monopolists, of course, also can engage in output-restricting conduct that
may affect rivals' opportunities. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605-11 (1985). In cases of output-restricting conduct by
single firms, courts may assess, from an allocative efficiency standpoint, the net
effect of the practice on marketwide output over a sustained period of time. For
example, the output-restricting conduct may consist in the exercise of a contractual
or intellectual property right that itself encourages output expansion by the
monopolist and/or the rival through investment and innovation.
59 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994).
60 See id.
61 See id. at 969.
62 Id. at 965 (citation omitted).
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output .... Without market power, consumers shop around to
find a rival offering a better deal.
[Ilt is not the rule-making per se [by which Sears is excluded]
that should be the focus of the market power analysis, but the
effect of those rules-whether they increase price, decrease
output, or otherwise capitalize on barriers to entry that
potential rivals cannot overcome.
[D]oes [the rule] restrain trade in a manner which alters the
structure of the general purpose credit card market and, thus,
harms consumers? 63
Although the Court found that Sears had not proven that it
could introduce a Prime Option card only with Visa's help,64 the
Tenth Circuit focused almost entirely on the effect of the
exclusion not on Sears or Discover Card but on the structure of
the relevant market. The court thus found:
[T]he evidence established the current market in general
purpose credit cards is structurally competitive, issuers
targeting different consumer groups and consumer needs. In
this market, Sears already competes vigorously. Surely, if its
goal is to compete more effectively in that market, we do not
believe this objective constitutes the proverbial sparrow the
Sherman Act protects. "[A] producer's loss is no concern of the
antitrust laws, which protect consumers from suppliers rather
than suppliers from each other."65
In contrast, the Federal Trade Commission's (the
"Commission") case against Toys "'R" US (TRU)66 focused more
on the effect of TRU's restraint on the discounting warehouse
clubs than on the marketwide impact of that restraint. TRU was
found to have acted in concert with toy manufacturers to restrict
the type of toys sold by toy manufacturers to warehouse clubs,
which typically offered toys at low prices with little service.67
Significantly, the Commission found that the relevant market
within which the practices should be assessed was the "retail toy
market," thereby including specialty superstores such as TRU,
63 Id. at 965, 968, 970 (emphasis added).
64 See id. at 972.
65 Id. (citations omitted).
66 In re Toys "-R" Us, No. 9278, 1998 WL 727602, at *2 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 1998).
67 See id. at *15.
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mass merchandisers such as Walmart and Kmart, and wholesale
clubs such as BJ's and Costco. 68
In its rule of reason analysis of the competitive effects of
TRU's conduct, the Commission acknowledged that the clubs at
their peak accounted for only 1.9% of the relevant market and
that, by 1995, that share had fallen to 1.4%.69 The Commission
further acknowledged TRUs argument that any conduct
reducing output by only .05% of total market sales could not
materially affect price or output on a marketwide basis.70 The
one-half percent reduction in the clubs' output could easily be
offset by a slight increase in output by any one of the competitors
accounting for more than the remaining 98% of total market
sales.7 '
The Commission, however, drew a direct relationship
between harm to a rival-even a small rival-and harm to
competition and, in turn, harm to consumers:
Far from a single small business, the clubs were growing chains
of retailers operating hundreds of outlets nationally and
employing a distinctly new and efficient method of distribution.
Because the boycott injured the clubs, it also harmed
competition, and because competition was harmed, consumer
welfare was reduced. Although the antitrust laws protect
competition and not competitors, there can be no competition
without able competitors. A policy that selectively eliminates
effective competitors (or the ones most threatening to
incumbent firms) harms the competitive process even though
individual firms are the targets. 72
68 See id. at *55.
69 See id. at *29.
70 See id at *69.
71 See id.
72 Id. (emphasis added). In Microsoft the court of appeals also used the term
"competitive process" with ambiguous import. 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir 2001). In
addition, Justice Breyer has also identified on several occasions protection of the
"competitive process" as the basic objective of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Town of
Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[A] practice is
'anticompetitive' only if it harms the competitive process."); see also Clamp-All Corp.
v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486 (1st Cir. 1988) ("nticompetitive...
refers... to actions that harm the competitive process."). Most recently, in NYNEX
Corp. v. Discon, Inc., Justice Breyer identified the "competitive process" as the
object of antitrust protection no less than seven times. 525 U.S. 128, 135-40 (1998).
He noted in NYNEX that harm to the "competitive process" entails more than harm
to a "single competitor" and requires an injury to "competition itself." Id. at 135.
But Justice Breyer did not clarify in NYNEX whether "competitive process" is
synonymous with "consumer welfare" and allocative efficiency or whether
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The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision on
competitive effects, largely on the strength of the Commission's
findings below. 73
The Commission implicitly conceded that the foregoing did
not amount to a finding that TRU's conduct reduced output or
increased price throughout the relevant market for the retail
sale of toys. Importantly, however, the Commission concluded
that proof that such an impact had actually occurred was not
necessary to a determination that consumers had been harmed.7 4
In support of its position, the Commission noted that the
Supreme Court stated in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists75
that the conduct there at issue "is likely enough to disrupt the
proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism of the market
that it may be condemned even absent proof that it resulted in
higher prices or, as here, the purchase of higher priced services,
than would occur in its absence."76 The Commission found that
TRU's conduct was directly analogous to that of the Indiana
Federation of Dentists and thus could be presumed to disrupt
the proper functioning of prices throughout the retail market for
toys, without proof that such an effect had or would occur.77
The Visa USA and In re Toys "R" Us cases thus reflect a
significantly different perspective on whether injury to
consumers can be inferred from harm to a rival seeking to
provide a discounted product through a means that may
threaten the parties to the restraint. Both courts agreed that, in
the rule of reason context, harm to consumers must be shown.
They disagreed, however, on the proof necessary to establish
that such harm did or would occur.
"competitive process" refers to the process of rivalry to which the Commission
adverted in the In re Toys "R" Us decision and to which the D.C. Circuit may have
referred in Microsoft Corp.
73 See Toys R Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 934-35 (7th Cir. 2000).
74 See In re Toys "R" Us, No. 9278, 1998 WL 727602, at *71 (F.T.C. Oct. 13,
1998).
75 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
76 See In re Toys "R" Us, at *71 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 1998).
77 Id. California Dentist acknowledged that Ind. Fed'n of Dentists properly
invoked the quick-look doctrine. California Dental, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). In that
quick-look context, as clarified by California Dentist, actual proof of competitive
effect was not required before the burden of demonstrating a procompetitive effect
was shifted to the defendant. The continuing vitality of the use of Ind. Fed'n of
Dentists, in the wake of California Dentist as support for the Commission's
discussion of the need (or lack thereof) to prove marketwide impact in the context of
a full rule of reason analysis may thus be subject to question.
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D. Reducing "Consumer Choice" Through Harm to Rivals
Some have also argued that harm to rivals causes consumer
harm by reducing the choices available to consumers-namely,
the choices that rivals offered to consumers before the rivals
were harmed.78 For example, the Commission's decision in In re
Toys "R" Us identified as a form of consumer injury a reduction
in the range of choices available to consumers that resulted from
the harm that TRU inflicted upon the warehouse clubs:
[TRU's conduct] reduced the range of choices available to
consumers and eliminated forms of competition that consumers
desired and would have been able to enjoy absent TRU's policy.
Club shoppers were not able to buy the products they wanted at
the clubs. They either had to buy their second-choice goods
(e.g., custom or combo packs of goods) at their first-choice stores
(warehouse clubs) or their first-choice goods (e.g., individually
packaged branded toys) at their second-choice stores (TRU,
Wal-Mart, Target).79
The Microsoft case also included much discussion of
"consumer choice" as a legally significant consumer injury.80 The
Department of Justice (DOJ) argued that MVicrosoft reduced
consumer choice by reducing the significance of Navigator and
Java on the competitive landscape.81 As a result of Mcrosoft's
alleged predation, Navigator and Java were used less widely
and, given the typical network effect of reduced distribution,
became less attractive to consumers.8 2
Other courts are less inclined to credit reduced consumer
choice if the reduction is not marketwide or, put differently but
to the same effect, if the consumer has reasonably
78 See supra note 7.
79 In re Toys "R" Us, No. 9278, 1998 WL 727602, at *71 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 1998).
80 See United States v. licrosoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d. 30, 37 (D.D.C. 2000)
affd in part, rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), (stating that reducing the
ability of other firms in the relevant market to offer customers choices is central to
identifying "exclusionary" conduct); see also Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 87 (stating that
the primary rationale for the rule against tying is that "tying prevents goods from
competing directly for consumer choice on their merits").
81 See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
82 See id. Mcrosoft also allegedly reduced consumer choice by imposing on
consumers a free copy of Internet Explorer with every new copy of Windows and by
restricting OEMs from altering the start-up sequence or eliminating the Internet
Explorer icon from the Windows desktop. Such conduct, however, involves
restrictions relating only to Aficrosoft's own product offerings, not to marketwide
alternatives.
20011 579
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
interchangeable substitutes available. As the Federal Circuit
recently held in Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., "harm to an
individual competitor or consumer is not sufficient" to constitute
a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.83 Nor does harm to
an individual consumer imply harm to all consumers in a
relevant market, as consumers differ considerably in the
intensity of their preferences for a particular price/quality mix in
a given good or service.84 The downward sloping demand curve
in every market reflects differing intensities among consumer
preferences for the relevant product.
Assuming that promoting allocative efficiency remains the
objective, the question is presumably not whether one or another
consumer's range of choice (or even consumption of the relevant
good) has been limited. Rather, the question is whether the
production or consumption of all goods in the relevant market
has been materially reduced on an aggregate basis due to the
challenged practice. Asking whether "consumer choice" has been
limited may thus be just another way of asking whether
marketwide consumption has been reduced, which in turn is just
another way of asking whether the market-clearing output level
has been decreased and the proper allocation of resources
distorted. The inquiry may thus remain at the marketwide and
aggregate level, not at the level of an individual or a cluster of
individuals, regardless of whether the individuals are sellers or
buyers.
Defining the relevant scope of output is a crucial issue in
assessing whether a "marketwide" effect has or will likely occur.
If the range of relevant output is limited to that of the rival (e.g.,
customers of warehouse clubs, accounting for 1.9% of the total
consumption in the relevant market), then harm to rivals will
necessarily imply consumer injury through reduced output and
restricted consumer choice. If, however, reasonably practicable
alternatives (toys purchased through all retailers, including TRU
and mass merchandisers) are included in the range of relevant
output, then harm to a rival may leave consumers (or other
83 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d at 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting
Mr. Furniture Warehouse, Inc. v. Barclays AmJCommercial Inc., 919 F.2d 1517,
1522 (11th Cir. 1990).
84 See UNR Indus., Inc. v. Conti Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 1319, 1328 (N.D. In1.
1985) (noting that consumers through the relevant market, not just isolated
consumers, are necessary for a Sherman Act violation).
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rivals) with sufficient alternatives so that total output and
consumption are unaffected by the conduct in question.85
We turn next to a consideration of differing approaches that
courts have taken in defining the relevant scope of output to be
used to determine whether or not a "marketwide" impact has
occurred.
I1. SMARKETWIDE" IMPACT: NEXT BEST SUBSTITUTES OR
FUNCTIONAL INTERCHANGEABILITY?
Merger decisions addressing competition among (1) retail
formats, (2) products located along an extended price/quality
spectrum, and (3) sellers located in adjacent geographic areas
provide useful examples of courts' assessing whether the
relevant scope of output includes only next best substitutes (the
output primarily of closely situated merging parties) or the full
range of functionally interchangeable alternatives (the output of
the merging parties and a variety of other competitors). In each
case, the competitive effects assessment turned primarily on the
court's determination of the scope of relevant output.8 6
A. Retail Format
Two cases illustrate the differing results that occurred when
the pertinent output was limited to the merging parties' retail
format87 and when it was defined more broadly in terms of
functional interchangeability.88 Although cases always turn on
85 Some courts include reasonably practicable alternatives within the scope of
relevant output despite claims that a subset of those alternatives is preferable to
others. See, e.g., PepsiCo., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 114 F. Supp. 2d 243, 252 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (asserting that a preference for one form of delivery by certain customers does
not define a market when other forms of distribution are viable) "Whether or not a
customer would have chosen bottler delivery of Pepsi given a choice between bottler
and distributor delivery is irrelevant to the determination that an equivalent
product can be obtained through other means." Id.; see also Omega Envtl., Inc. v.
Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the relevant
scope of output in assessing vertical foreclosure is not limited to the most efficient,
advantageous, or attractive means of distribution; rather, the relevant scope of
output must include the fuill range of reasonably interchangeable selling
alternatives available to rivals).
86 The discussions below of retail format, a price/quality continuum, and
geographic consumption patterns, address only demand-side issues and do not
consider the role of supply responses in a competitive effects assessment.
87 See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
88 See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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the unique factual context in which they arise, they can also
reflect a difference in analytical perspective. FTC v. Staples Inc.
focused on the strategic maneuvering between competitors that
were closely situated on the competitive landscape, and Long
Island Jewish Medical Center embraces a larger swath of that
landscape by focusing on functional interchangeability.
The Staples. story is well known. The FTC proposed as a
relevant market "the sale of consumable office supplies through
office supply superstores." 9 Here the FTC used "consumable" to
mean products that consumers recurrently buy and discard, such
as paper, pens, file folders, post-it notes, computer disks, and
toner cartridges. 90 That market included only Staples, Office
Depot, and Office Max. The defendants suggested that the
proper market was the overall sale of office supplies, of which
the combined Staples and Office Depot accounted for only five
and one half percent.91  After reviewing extensive pricing
evidence and numerous internal documents of Staples and Office
Depot, the court concluded that the "the sale of consumable office
supplies through office supply superstores is the appropriate
relevant product market for purposes of considering the possible
anti-competitive effects of the proposed merger between Staples
and Office Depot."92
The Staples court seemed most influenced by pricing data
and party documents that indicated that Staples' prices differed
geographically depending, at least in part, on whether one or
both of the other office superstores were present in the specific
location.93 Few would dispute that the office superstores are
next-best substitutes for each other in the sale of office
consumables and that each would likely be most concerned with
the other in determining the price and selection of products and
the location of new outlets. On the other hand, the court focused
89 Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1074.
90 Id.
91 See id. at 1075.
92 Id. at 1080; see also FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45-49,
58-61 (D.D.C. 1998) (restricting the relevant market to the wholesale distribution of
pharmaceutical drugs and effectively limiting the relevant competitors in that
market to national wholesale distributors); Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep't
Stores, 881 F. Supp. 860, 872-73 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (defining relevant product market
as including "traditional department stores" and excluding other retail formats that
sold similar merchandise of apparel and furniture).
93 See Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1080.
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less on the extent that mass merchandisers and warehouse clubs
effectively competed with the office superstores.94
To the extent the court addressed superstore competition
with mass merchandisers and warehouse clubs, it found that the
other superstores were a considerably more important factor in
the setting of Staples' prices than were either mass
merchandisers or warehouse clubs.95  The court's decision,
however, did not compare levels of prices for similar office
consumables across superstores, mass merchandisers, and
warehouse clubs; did not estimate the extent of overlap in
consumables offered by the various retail formats (e.g., such core
products as paper, pens, pencils, etc.); and did not consider the
number of common customers served by the retailers. Nor did
the court cite evidence reflecting the responsiveness of
warehouse and mass merchandiser prices or product offerings to
changes in prices or offerings in superstores.
The office superstores' preoccupation with one another,
given their similarity in format and offerings, may be neither
surprising nor dispositive in defining the scope of relevant
output from an economic perspective. 96 That is, focus on each
other as the next-best substitute may not necessarily imply that
both parties are not reasonably constrained by mass
merchandisers or warehouse clubs with a somewhat different
retail format.
For example, other retail formats may consist of a narrower
array of consumables (though still including high-velocity items
of most consumer interest) at prices that are not as consistently
discounted, but located near a variety of other household
consumables that may be purchased at the same time. The mass
merchandiser format may provide greater convenience than the
superstore format and may be in equilibrium with the superstore
format at the price discrepancy between the two at pre-
9 Recall that Complaint Counsel for the FTC had forcefully argued, and the
Commission had crucially found, that superstores (e.g., Toys R Us), mass
merchandisers (e.g., Walmart), and warehouse clubs (e.g., Costco) directly competed
with each other in the Toys "R" Us case. See In re Toys "R" Us, No. 9278, 1998 WL
727602 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 1998).
95 Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1076-80.
96 See, e.g., D. Yao, Business Strategy from Alternative Perspectives, Antitrust
(1998) (explaining that business documents may reflect strategic objectives not




transaction levels. If that discrepancy lessens due to a post-
transaction price increase by the superstores, common
consumers may find it uneconomical to spend the time and
energy to make a separate stop at the superstore for what is
reasonably available at the mass merchandiser.
When confronted with remarkably similar issues in a
different industry within four months of the Staples decision, the
Long Island Jewish Medical Center court embraced a broader
scope of output as relevant in assessing the competitive impact
of the proposed merger between Long Island Jewish Medical
Center (LIJ) and North Shore Manhasset (NSM).97 In a story
less well-known than Staples, the DOJ proposed a market in
Long Island Jewish Medical Center consisting of primary and
secondary health care provided by anchor hospitals in Queens
and Nassau counties. 98 "Anchor hospitals" were defined as
hospitals "having prestigious reputations, broad ranging and
highly sophisticated services, and high quality medical staffs."99
The DOJ:
distinguishes between the "general acute care hospitals" and
the major prestigious acute care "anchor" hospitals like [North
Shore Manhasset] and LIJ, which are in "a [unique] market to
serve as an anchor hospital for a managed care plan." [DOJ]
asserts that "community hospitals are not reasonably
interchangeable" with anchor hospitals. °0
The DOJ further emphasized that the merging parties in
Long Island Jewish Medical Center would have market power
only in primary and secondary care, relative commodities in the
health care industry.1 1 The DOJ did not contend that the
merging parties would have market power in tertiary care,
which involves more specialized, complex, and expensive
procedures. 102
97 See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137,
141 (rejecting the government's proposed relevant product market that included
primary and secondary care, but excluded tertiary care).
98 See id. at 140 (explaining the proposed geographic market as the area
surrounding the merging hospitals in Nassau and Queens).
99 Id. at 137.
100 Id.
101 Id. (limiting the government's version of the product market to only primary
and secondary care, excluding tertiary care at anchor hospitals).
102 See id. at 138. Note the testimony of Dr. Vistnes, Assistant Chief Economist
at the Antitrust Division of the DOJ: "Q: And do you believe that after the merger of
[NSM] and [LIJ] will be monopolist for tertiary care services? A= No, I do not." Id.
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The thrust of the DOJ's case in Long Island Jewish Medical
Center was almost identical to that of the FTC's case in Staples.
In both instances, the enforcement agencies argued that the
merging parties were closely situated on the competitive
landscape-essentially next-best substitutes. The agencies
further argued that, through the proposed merger, the merging
parties would acquire market power in the sale of a commodity
product that, although otherwise available, could be obtained
only through differently configured sources that were not in the
relevant product market.10 3 Yet those arguments prompted
opinions that could not read more differently.
The Long Island Jewish Medical Center court rejected the
DOJ's product market definition and found that primary and
secondary health care services were available from a variety of
community hospitals:
The Government has failed to establish that the acute inpatient
services produced at these so called "anchor hospitals" are
unique and would support its own relevant product market. As
set forth above, approximately 85 percent of the services
provided by LIJ and NSM involve primary and secondary care.
The evidence is clear that these services are offered by
numerous other hospitals in Nassau and Queens. The Court
finds that with regard to primary and secondary care services,
LIJ and NSM competes [sic] with the community hospitals in
Nassau and Queens, such as Mercy, Mid-Island and South
Nassau Community in Nassau and Elmhurst Hospital Center,
Flushing Medical, Peninsula Hospital Center and St. John's
Episcopal in Queens.' 04
The court further found that the reputation of the merging
parties as anchor hospitals would not prevent their patients from
seeking the primary and secondary care elsewhere in the event
of a post-transaction price increase:
Indeed, in the Court's view, the Government essentially
concedes this point. Rather than argue that these services are
unavailable elsewhere, the plaintiff maintains that the
"reputation" of LIJ and NSM is what separates them from the
crowd .... The problem with this "reputation" evidence is that
it is based on "perception" of where patients currently go, rather
than where they could practically go for acute care inpatient
103 See id. at 143 (arguing that the merger will result in a 20% price increase
for primary and secondary services).
104 Id. at 138.
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services in the future. The more material question is not the
present customer's perception of the available hospital care, but
the future likelihoods.
Also, the Court finds that the Government's characterization of
an anchor hospital as a relevant product market is
unnecessarily restrictive in that it fails to take into
consideration the dynamics of the marketplace.
The Long Island Jewish Medical Center court rejected the retail
format as the critical element in market definition, noting that
the proper relevant market would be the provision of "general
acute care inpatient hospital services, rather than the provision
of these services by anchor hospitals."10 5
Having identified the scope of pertinent output on which to
assess competitive impact, the Long Island Jewish Medical
Center court reached a conclusion diametrically opposed to that
of the Staples court despite the fact that the merging parties
were next-best substitutes:
In the defined relevant product and geographic markets, the
Government failed to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the merged entity would, in all probability,
produce an anti-competitive effect, by a price rise above
competitive levels or a reduction in services. The Court reaches
this conclusion despite the fact that presently LIJ and NSM are
two of the premier teaching hospitals in Queens and Nassau, are
direct competitors, and would be sought after by MCOs.106
Staples and Long Island Jewish Medical Center thus provide
differing views on the proper scope of pertinent output with
respect to which competitive effect (or consumer injury) should
be assessed. Staples focused on the immediate competition
among closely situated retailers and the impact of the proposed
transaction solely on office superstore output. Long Island
Jewish Medical Center rejected the retail format as relevant and
embraced the characteristics of the service, its general
105 Id. at 138-40; see also PepsiCo, Inc., v. Coca-Cola Co., 114 F. Supp. 2d 243,
249-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting a proposed relevant market limited to a form of
distribution and finding that alternative forms of distribution, even if less desirable
or efficient, presented practicable alternatives to cola syrup manufacturers); Omega
Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the
relevant scope of output includes both direct sales to end users as well as sales
through distributors).
106 983 F. Supp. 121, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (emphasis added).
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availability, and the reasonably practicable alternatives of
consumers (i.e., where consumers could practically go) in the
event of an increase in price or reduction in output of the
merging parties.
B. Product Spectrum
Determining where to define relevant boundaries on a
price/quality product spectrum was usefully addressed in United
States v. Gillette Co. 10 7 In that case, Gillette Company ("Gillette")
offered to purchase Parker Pen Holdings, Ltd.108 The DOJ sued
to enjoin the transaction on the ground that it would lessen
competition in the "premium fountain pen market."0 9
Defendants claimed that a market for fountain pens may not be
segregated from a continuum of prices and quality on which
fountain pens are offered" 0 and that the market definition
should be expanded to include other writing instruments."'
The court addressed the continuum issue primarily on the
basis of functionality or the use to which the writing instruments
are put. It found that fountain pens of less than $50 are "base"
fountain pens and used for ordinary writing purposes. Fountain
pens between $50 and $400 are used for prestige and image
purposes along with functional writing."2 Fountain pens of $400
and up primarily serve as collector items and jewelry pieces."i 3
The court used those different functions to define reasonable
interchangeability and to accept that premium fountain pens are
sold in a different market from those in which base and jewelry
fountain pens are sold."i 4
The court then addressed the crucial question of whether
premium fountain pens form a market distinct from other
107 828 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1993).
108 See id. at 79-80 (stating that on March 23, 1993, Gillette offered to buy all
outstanding stock and options of Parker).
109 See id. at 80 (noting that based on 1991 sales, Gillette controlled
approximately twenty-one percent of the U.S. premium fountain pen sales as
compared to Parker, which controlled a nineteen percent share).
110 See id. at 81. (arguing that the government cannot exclude pens with




113 See id at 82.
114 See id
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premium writing instruments. 115 The court acknowledged that
plaintiff had demonstrated that some set of fountain pen
consumers are dedicated to premium fountain pens and that
such consumers will not substitute another mode of writing (e.g.,
ballpoint pens, rollerball pens, or mechanical pencils) when
confronted with a non-trivial, non-transitory price increase in
fountain pens.116 But the court found that the set of fountain
pen devotees does not encompass the entire universe of fountain
pen consumers:
The record indicates that there is a much larger subset of
fountain pen consumers who will substitute other modes of
writing for fountain pens; for these customers, fountain pens
therefore are in direct competition with these other modes ....
This market is defined as all premium writing instruments
(which the court will, for purposes of this discussion, define as
mechanical pencils and refillable ballpoint, rollerball, and
fountain pens with [suggested retail prices] from $40-$400).117
The Gillette court implicitly distinguished between
inframarginal (or particularly loyal) and marginal (less loyal and
willing to substitute an alternative product) consumers, a
distinction that has become part of common antitrust parlance.
Concluding that the merging parties' marginal consumers of
premium fountain pens were sufficiently numerous to render a
price increase unprofitable, the court found that the relevant
scope of output on which impact was to be assessed included all
forms of premium writing instruments. 81
The Long Island Jewish Medical Center court, though not
referring to a marginal-consumer analysis, seems to have
15 See id. at 83.
116 See id.
117 Id. at 83 (citation omitted). Implicit in the Gillette court's market definition
is a determination that the pen manufacturers could not identify and discriminate
between fountain pen devotees and less loyal fountain pen consumers. The court did
not address whether, if a class of fountain pen devotees had been identifiable, it
would have either acceded to a market definition based upon their subjective
preferences or defined the market from an objective perspective according to
reasonably practicable alternatives (i.e., other premium writing instruments serving
the dual purposes of writing and prestige). The Long Island Jewish Medical Center
court, 983 F. Supp. at 140, and the Eighth Circuit in FTC v. Tenet Health Care
Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999), both used a "practicable availability"
standard for defining the scope of relevant output in assessing competitive effect.
Although neither court addressed the issue of "objectivity" or "subjectivity," that
standard appears to be objective and based upon functional interchangeability.
118 Gillette, 828 F. Supp. at 85.
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employed at least a variation on that theme. Even if a set of
patients found the reputation of LIJ and NSM to be a compelling
reason to seek primary or secondary care at those institutions in
the face of a price increase, the community hospitals provided,
from an objective standpoint, a sufficiently acceptable
alternative source of primary and secondary care to support a
finding of reasonable interchangeability. Staples on the other
hand, seemed to have assumed that few of the office superstore
customers were marginal. In other words, the Staples court
seemed to assume that most, if not all, office superstore
customers did not shop for paper, pens, and pencils at other
retailers or practicably could not do so even in the face of a
material price or output effect at office superstores.
C. Geographic Consumption Patterns
The court in FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp.11 9 reviewed a
formal "critical loss" analysis based on the concepts of
inframarginal and marginal consumers implicitly employed by
the court in Gillette. The FTC argued that the relevant
geographic market for the two merging hospitals in Poplar Bluff,
Missouri consisted of the area in which the hospitals obtained
ninety percent of their patients-namely, a fifty-mile radius from
downtown Poplar Bluff.20 Although that geographic area
included four other hospitals, the proposed merger would result
in the merging parties' having an eighty-four percent share of
patient hospital usage.'2i
The defendants proposed a relevant market that
encompassed a sixty five-mile radius from downtown Poplar
Bluff in addition to a hospital in St. Louis. 2 2 Defendants'
proposed geographic market included sixteen hospitals in
addition to those in the FTC's proposed geographic market. 23
Defendants supported their proposed market by arguing that the
merged entity would be unable to raise prices without causing
the "critical loss" of sufficient marginal consumers to make the
11 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
12 See id. at 1052 (noting that a service area is not always the same as the
merging firm's geographic market area in antitrust analysis).
121 See id. (stating that the four other hospitals consisted of a Tenet-owned





increase unprofitable.124 The court described the critical loss
analysis upon which it relied as follows: "A 'critical loss' analysis
would identify the threshold number of patients who, by seeking
care at other hospitals, could defeat a price increase by making it
unprofitable. The purchasing behavior of these patients or
'marginal consumers' would discipline or constrain any potential
price increase by a merged entity."125
The defendants' economist testified that, based upon the
critical loss analysis that he had performed, "if the merged
hospital were to raise prices, enough patients would leave the
merged hospital and seek care at an alternative hospital to
render the price increase unprofitable." 2 6  In this regard,
defendants showed that many commercially insured patients
already sought treatment at hospitals outside Poplar Bluff for
services that were available in Poplar Bluff hospitals. 2 7
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the defendants and held,
"[T]he district court improperly discounted the fact that over
twenty-two percent of people in the most important zip codes
already use hospitals outside the FTC's proposed market for
treatment that is offered at Poplar Bluff hospitals. The district
court also failed to fully credit the significance of the consumers
who live outside Poplar Bluff, particularly those patients within
the FTC's proposed geographic market who actually live or
work closer to a hospital outside that geographic market than
to either of the Poplar Bluff hospitals .... The proximity of
many patients to hospitals in other towns, coupled with the
compelling and essentially unrefuted evidence that the switch
to another provider by a small percentage of patients would
constrain a price increase, shows that the FTC's proposed
market is too narrow.128
Like the Long Island Jewish Medical Center court, the
Eighth Circuit also discounted the testimony of market
participants regarding their choices in the event the merging
parties raised prices on the ground that the "market participants
spoke to current competitor perceptions and consumer habits
and failed to show where consumers could practicably go for
124 Id. at 1053.
125 Id. at 1050.
126 Id.
127 See id. (using a zip-code-by-zip-code "contestability analysis" to show that
patients would switch hospitals to defeat a price increase).
128 Id. at 1053-54.
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inpatient hospital services."129 Ultimately, the court described
the competition between the merging parties in Poplar Bluff as a
"war in a small corner of the market" and concluded that the
antitrust laws do not require the preservation of that war when
practical alternatives are available.130
The Tenet Health Care court thus construed the next-best-
substitute competition between the merging parties as occurring
in a "small corner of the market." According to the Eighth
Circuit, when the scope of practicable alternatives to patients of
the merging parties was properly defined, the merging parties
had no power to affect "marketwide" output by imposing higher
prices, providing less service, or otherwise harming patients'
interests. Tenet Health Care's approach to assessing consumer
injury was similar to that of Long Island Jewish Medical Center
and Gillette, though different from that of Staples.
CONCLUSION
Courts and the enforcement agencies appear to agree that
consumer injury is a necessary element in antitrust litigation not
involving the per se rule of illegality or the quick-look doctrine
and that such an injury generally involves a market-related
impact on price or output. They differ, however, on the evidence
required to prove that injury. Surveyed above are just two
topics-harm to rivals and the proper scope of relevant output-
on which courts and the enforcement agencies have differed in
assessing the marketwide impact of a challenged practice. Those
differences reflect the need to develop a consistent framework for
assessing whether one or another form of challenged conduct has
or will likely injure consumers.
129 Id. at 1054 (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 1055.
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